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Abstract—As the rapid expansion of smart phones and as-
sociated data-intensive applications continues, we expect to see
renewed interest in dynamic prioritization schemes as a way
to increase the total utility of a heterogeneous user base, with
each user experiencing variable demand and value for access. We
adapt a recent sampled-based mechanism for resource allocation
to this setting, which is more effective in aligning incentives in a
setting with variable demand than an earlier method for pricing
network resources due to Varian and Mackie-Mason (1994).
Complementing our theoretical analysis, which also considers
incentives on the sell-side of the market, we present the results
of a simulation study, conﬁrming the effectiveness of our protocol
in aligning incentives and boosting welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
“I had to give my shirt to AT&T for my data plan,” goes
a recent TV commercial. With users now commonly owning
several devices that need wireless broadband connectivity
(smartphones, tablets, ebook-readers), the effective allocation
of wireless bandwidth capacity is becoming a serious issue.
High variability in data consumption further compounds the
problem. According to a recent study by Nielsen Co. [1], the
average data consumption was less than 300MB per month
but the top 6% of users consume half of all wireless data.
Our focus is on dynamic (re)prioritization of access to wire-
less spectrum. Whereas a static allocation is inefﬁcient because
of high variability of demand, the goal in contemplating a
market for prioritized access is to ensure that capacity is
always in the hands of users with the most instantaneous value.
A further consideration is that the protocol promote stability,
in the sense that incentives should be aligned with truthful
reporting of value for network access. Achieving incentive
compatibility in this sense is useful in promoting simple
control logic for devices, when competing for access on behalf
of users, and also in avoiding the churn and system overhead
that would occur if devices could beneﬁt from adapting their
bids to the bids of others.
Our particular application focus is on making wireless
broadband allocation more efﬁcient, through the design of a
protocol for auctioning wireless broadband bandwidth. Sellers
in this market have wireless broadband (3G/4G) enabled
devices with a wireless LAN radio such as 802.11 and a
monthly data plan, and the ability to facilitate bandwidth
sharing through tethering apps which essentially allow them to
act as routers. Buyers have WiFi devices and pay the sellers to
relay their data. While auctions can introduce an extra burden
on users over simply charging a ﬂat fee, they can greatly
increase the efﬁciency of the system, with the complexity
hidden through automated bidding agents.
We describe a competitive prioritization scheme where users
submit bids and generate trafﬁc to be prioritized for forwarding
at the shared router. The scheme is incentive compatible for a
setting in which each user has a ﬁxed per-packet value over
a ﬁxed period of time (speciﬁc to the user). The scheme is
presented for an ‘open loop’ demand model in which each
user’s next packet is generated to be sent after some arbitrary
delay from the previous packet. The results also extend to
a ‘closed loop’ model where the delay to the next packet
occurs after the current packet is forwarded by the router, not
generated by the user. In particular, a user can do no better
than bidding truthfully and consuming bandwidth as soon as
demand is realized, with no regret as to the outcome, whatever
the future realization of demand.
Our approach adopts a recent innovation in computational
mechanism design due to Babaioff et al. (BKS) [2], which
provides incentive compatibility in domains where payments
cannot be computed through “counterfactual” information.
Counterfactual information is data about what an allocation
would have been under alternate bids. This is not available in
network settings, where only the demand consistent with the
actual prioritization is available; e.g., it is not knowable what
a low-priority user who attempted to send one packet over
some period of time would have demanded if that packet had
been forwarded.1
We contrast the proposed scheme with an early idea due
to Varian and Mackie-Mason (VMM) [6]. VMM proposed a
per-packet auction based on packets dropped from a router’s
queue. This is a myopic pricing scheme, and leads to a failure
of incentive compatibility in environments with dynamic de-
mand. In comparison, the approach enabled by BKS allows for
payments that account for variable demand, estimating the ac-
tual externality imposed on other devices by the prioritization
1Babaioff et al. [3] and Devanur et al. [4] ﬁrst showed that the unavailability
of counterfactuals impedes the design of truthful mechanisms, in the context
of multi-armed bandit problems. Cavallo et al. [5] also study incentives in
multi-armed bandit setting. We give a practical motivation for this work in
the context of networking.associated with a device.2
A new challenge in our environment is to ensure that buyers
will trust the seller (i.e., the owner of the wireless broadband
device) to faithfully follow the rules of the proposed auction.
To address this, we introduce a revenue pooling scheme,
which ensures that sellers have no proﬁtable manipulations by
making the mechanism appear to sellers as a variation on a
ﬁrst-price auction in which the sellers pay a ﬁxed “tax rate” on
their revenue. Our scheme is similar to the Hartline-Goldberg
random-sampling approach for digital good auctions [12].
We present the results of a simulation study, which conﬁrms
that the mechanism achieves truthfulness and arbitrary approx-
imations to allocative efﬁciency (allocating the shared resource
to those who value them the most). In testing robustness to
more realistic assumptions, we consider the behavior of the
market when bid periods are not exactly aligned with market
dynamics, examining the effect on performance. Finally, we
examine the distributional effects of revenue pooling.
II. BASIC NETWORK MODEL
We consider a single seller with a router, and a set of n
buyers (or users) N = f1;:::;ng. The users send packets
to the router, which queues them and forwards them in some
order. For simplicity, time is discretized into epochs, where an
epoch is the time it takes to forward a packet. New packets
from users arrive at the start of each epoch.
In each epoch, any new packets received by the router are
added to the queue, and if the queue is non-empty, the router
forwards a packet chosen according to a routing policy. We
assume that if the router drops any packets from the queue,
they are immediately resent by the corresponding user.
The seller sets a per-packet reserve price r  0. This ensures
the the per-packet revenue is at least r. The mechanism runs
between start and end epochs f0;Tg, and each user is active
for some subinterval of [0;T]. The stochastic demand di of
user i 2 N is modeled as a sequence of random variables
dij, representing the delay between the sends of sequential
packets. Even if many previous packets are still waiting to be
forwarded, the buyer generates an additional packet to send.
Each user has a per-packet value vi and realized utility at
time T of,
ui(T) = fi(T)vi   pi; (1)
where fi(t) is the total number of packets forwarded for user
i by time t, and pi is the total payment made by the user at
the end of T epochs.
Each user submits a single bid bi  0 to the router.3 On
the basis of bids b = (b1;:::;bn), a routing policy determines
the order in which packets are forwarded at the router. Two
2Other approaches from dynamic mechanism design are unsuitable, either
because they rely on counterfactual information [7] or rely on a probabilistic
demand model [8]. VMM’s work was continued in related approaches, such
as the progressive second-price auction [9], and various follow-on work (
[10], [11]). As with VMM, these papers do not achieve incentive alignment
in dynamic settings. They also assume the existence of a trusted router.
3In our simulations, we also consider settings where users can bid more
than once.
possible policies are ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out (FIFO) and highest-bid-
ﬁrst. Under highest-bid-ﬁrst, if one buyer has a higher bid
than another, then the router always routes any queued packets
from the ﬁrst before any packets from the second. Given this,
let Ai(b;d) denote the allocation to user i (itself a random
variable, depending on the realized demand d = (d1;:::;dn)).
This is the number of packets forwarded by the router for user
i by time T. Let A(b;d) = (A1(b;d);:::;An(b;d)).
A. Fixed price and VMM
A baseline comparison is provided by FIXED, which charges
a ﬁxed price and uses a ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out routing policy. This
scheme is simple and incentive compatible, but can be very
inefﬁcient, as it is not responsive to variable demand or value.
The other comparison is provided by the VMM auction
mechanism, in which uses a highest-bid-ﬁrst routing policy.
Payments in VMM are computed per-packet, by charging the
owner of each forwarded packet the immediate externality
imposed by the packet. Speciﬁcally, the price for a forwarded
packet is the value of the highest value packet that was
dropped while the forwarded packet was in the queue.
Some observations about the VMM mechanism:
 Longer queue length implies lower payments. In partic-
ular, if the queue length is one, then this is exactly a
second-price auction among all arriving packets.
 VMM only charges for dropped packets, not for the delay
imposed by a packet on other packets.
 The payment scheme in VMM is not incentive compatible
in a setting with variable demand. Consider the following:
Example. Suppose that the queue length is one, and there
is one buyer with value $3 per packet who wants to send one
packet every epoch and a second buyer with value $2 per
packet who wants to send a single packet (available to send
in epoch one and available through the time period of interest
to buyer 1). Now truthful bidding by buyer 1 will result in
a charge of $2 for each packet, representing the per-epoch
externality on the packet that buyer 2 keeps trying to send
(recall that senders in our model are persistent, and will keep
resending dropped packets). On the other hand, a bid of less
than $2 would “ﬂush” the packet of buyer 2 and then allow
buyer 1 to send for the remaining epochs with payment $0.
The tradeoff is to reduce the number of packets forwarded by
1 in return for a signiﬁcant reduction in total payment.
B. The BKS mechanism
The problem with VMM in the example is that it over-
estimates the externality because it does not have access to
the information that buyer 2 only has a single packet to send.
But this information is not available, since we insist that
demand models are not described by users or known by the
prioritization scheme.
The innovation of the BKS scheme, applied in the paper of
Babaioff et al. [2] to a multi-armed bandits problem and some
simpler settings, is to use “self-sampling,” where a random-
ized perturbation to bids obviates the need for counterfactualinformation. The idea is to obtain an estimate of the network
resources that a user would have consumed at some lower bid
as a side-effect of the randomization.
We describe the BKS scheme, adapted here to allow the
seller to employ a reserve price r  0, which is the min-
imal per-packet price a seller will accept.4 The scheme is
parameterized by  2 (0;1), which governs the probability
of introducing a random perturbation into bids.
Deﬁnition 1 (BKS): Given an allocation rule A and a pa-
rameter  2 (0;1), the BKS procedure in our setting is:
1) Upon arrival, each bidder i submits a per-packet bid
bi  r.
2) The mechanism computes a transformed bid ~ bi for each
i as:
a) With probability 1   , ~ bi = bi
b) Else, compute a reduced bid: pick  2 [0;1] uni-
formly at random, and set ~ bi = r+(bi r)1=(1 )
3) For all T epochs, the router uses the allocation rule A
applied to the transformed bids ~ b of the active users.
4) Given the realized quantity of packets forwarded, ai  0,
for each user i, collect payment from user i as:
a) Collect biai.
b) If ~ bi < bi, give a rebate Ri = 1
(ai(bi   r)).
Otherwise, Ri = 0.
This procedure does not use counterfactuals: bids are per-
turbed, used for prioritized routing, the total number of packets
forwarded is observed, and payments are made with a rebate-
adjusted “pay-your-bid” payment scheme.
Deﬁnition 2: A mechanism is truthful-in-expectation if a
risk-neutral buyer maximizes expected utility by bidding truth-
fully, whatever the bids of others and whatever realized
demand, where the expectation is taken with respect to random
coin ﬂips of the mechanism.
In achieving truthfulness-in-expectation, an essential prop-
erty is that an allocation rule is monotone. This insists that
for all users i, and all realized demand d, and all bid
vectors b = (b1;:::;bi;:::;bn), that Ai(b0;d)  Ai(b;d),
for b0 = (b1;:::;b0
i;:::;bn) and b0
i > bi. We will establish
monotonicity for highest-bid-ﬁrst prioritization. For now, we
state the following result, due to Babaioff et al.:
Theorem 2.1 ( [2]): Applying the BKS procedure with
probability of perturbation  to a monotone allocation rule
results in a truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
In addition, the allocation is the same as in the original
allocation rule with probability at least 1 n, where n is the
number of buyers.
BKS prove this by showing that the scheme obtains an
unbiased sample of an integral that deﬁnes the payment rule
4Technical note: To support the reserve price, we use the h-canonical self-
resampling procedure described by BKS, with h(z;b) = r +z(b r), which
has distribution function Fh(a;b) = (a r)=(b r). In Section 3.4, the BKS
paper claims that Fh = F0 for all h, where F0 is the distribution function for
the canonical resampling procedure, but F0 doesn’t satisfy their condition on
Fh: h(Fh(a;b);b) = a for all a;b 2 I;a < b. Fh(a;b) = (a r)=(b r)
does satisfy this condition.
in the canonical approach of incentive-compatible mechanism
design [13].
Let’s revisit the earlier example of manipulation in the
VMM scheme. Under BKS, when the ﬁrst buyer’s bid is not
resampled, they pay $3 per packet, and send some number
of packets k. When their bid is resampled, the ﬁrst buyer will
have either k or k 1 packets forwarded, depending on whether
the resampled bid was below $2. This will result in a large
rebate, and in expectation, the ﬁrst buyer’s payment will be
essentially $2. The exact value depends on .
III. THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we summarize our results for buyer truth-
fulness and describe our approach to ensuring seller non-
manipulability. We defer proofs to an extended version of the
paper. We split our discussion into buy-side and sell-side.
A. Buy-side
In addition to truthful bidding, we are interested in establish-
ing that the scheme is demand revealing, in that it is a weakly
dominant strategy for a user not to introduce any additional
delay between the packets sent over the network.
The main result is:
Theorem 3.1: The BKS mechanism with highest-bid-ﬁrst
routing is truthful-in-expectation and demand-revealing.
The proof is established by demonstrating monotonicity for
highest-bid-ﬁrst priority routing. For this, we start with the
highest priority bidder, deﬁne sets of available epochs for
each bidder, and can immediately show through an inductive
argument that higher bids result in larger sets of available
epochs. This holds for all realized demand and all bids by
other users. We get the demand-revealing property because
only later allocations but not earlier allocations are possible
(and thus interesting) for a user, and delaying demand can only
reduce a user’s allocation because available epochs depend
only on the bid and the bids of higher-priority buyers.
B. Sell-side
If implemented on an untrusted device, the seller can
manipulate in various ways, for example by avoiding random
perturbations, charging more than it should, or avoiding rout-
ing trafﬁc when a bid has been down-sampled. Each one of
these manipulations will increase the seller’s revenue.
To preclude this, we propose a combination of cryptographic
methods and incentive engineering, transforming the revenue
stream to each seller by leveraging a pool of sellers.
The approach, ALIGN-TRUST, uses a trusted central server
for accounting and other validation, logically inserting it
between the buyer and seller. Buyers pay the center directly,
and the center pools the revenue and then pays sellers.
ALIGN-TRUST relies on two properties: the system must
ensure that sellers cannot tamper with bids, and that bid
perturbation is done correctly. Buyers can cryptographically
sign their bids to achieve bid integrity. A simple way to ensure
correct bid perturbation is to require that it be done by the
central server. This requires extra communication, but we hopethat this can be reduced via the use of pseudo-random number
generators, leading to veriﬁable decentralized perturbations.
We are not assuming that our trusted central server is om-
nipotent: we rely on it to verify bid integrity and resampling,
but do not assume that it can observe or enforce anything
about the sellers’ routing decisions. The incentives provided by
ALIGN-TRUST will ensure that routing as speciﬁed is optimal
for sellers, removing the sellers’ incentives to reduce the
allocation to buyers with resampled bids.
To ensure that following the highest-bid-ﬁrst routing policy
is optimal for sellers, our method pays sellers the resampled
bid for each packet. Because the mechanism also pays rebates
to the buyers, just paying resampled bids would leave the
center with a deﬁcit. We compensate by taxing the sellers
a percentage of their revenue. The details ensure that sellers
cannot reduce the tax rate they must pay, so they maximize
revenue by following the protocol.
In ALIGN-TRUST, time is divided into accounting periods,
perhaps a month long in practice. Each seller is required to
pick one of a small set of reserve prices. Consider the pool
of sellers that select the same reserve price. We apply the
following system-wide payment mechanism for the auctions
involving these sellers.
Deﬁnition 3 (ALIGN-TRUST): Consider an accounting pe-
riod, and a set of sellers M with the same reserve price.
1) Charge each user the (rebated) BKS payment across
all completed auctions for all sellers in M, crediting
each seller the ﬁrst-price revenue at the perturbed bids,
without including the rebates. The rebates leave the
center with a deﬁcit.
2) Randomly split the sellers in M into two disjoint sets
S1;S2. Let Cout
1 denote the total credit above reserve
price to sellers in S1. Let Cin
1 denote the total payment
received from buyers that participated in auctions of
sellers in S1. Deﬁne Cout
2 and Cin
2 similarly for sellers
in S2. The difference between Cout and Cin in each set
of sellers is that set’s total deﬁcit.
3) Deﬁne tax rate tax1 =
C
out
2  C
in
2
Cout
1 and tax2 =
C
out
1  C
in
1
Cout
2 .
Collect tax1 Cout
1 from sellers in S1, charging tax rate
tax1 uniformly across all sellers based on the above
reserve credit made to them in step 1. Collect tax2 
Cout
2 from sellers in S2, charging tax rate tax2 uniformly
across all sellers.
From the point of view of the sellers, ALIGN-TRUST
transforms the mechanism into a ﬁrst-price auction with a
revenue tax. A seller will receive some share of the revenue
achieved from forwarding packets at the perturbed bid values,
with the share maximized by following the highest-bid-ﬁrst
prioritization scheme:
Theorem 3.2: With probability that tends to 1 exponentially
quickly in the number of sellers with a given reserve price,
ALIGN-TRUST applied to BKS allows no proﬁtable manipula-
tions of the routing policy by sellers and provides each seller
with revenue at least its reserve price. The ALIGN-TRUST
applied to BKS mechanism leaves incentives unchanged for
Fig. 1. Manipulation of VMM by Buyer 0.
buyers (= users). The total payment received and made to all
sellers by the center is exactly balanced.
The proof relies strongly on our demand model: because the
set of packets available to a seller does not change based on
the routing policy, the seller maximizes revenue by forwarding
the most valuable packets ﬁrst, and our payment rule ensures
that these are the packets with highest resampled bids.5 We
show exponential convergence by using Hoeffding’s inequality
to bound the difference between the payments in the two pools.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now present selected results from a simulation study,
which conﬁrm our theoretical analysis and examine the be-
havior of our scheme in more complex settings where our
theoretical results do not apply. In particular, we examine VMM
truthfulness, compare the mechanisms’ economic efﬁciency,
explore how BKS works under uncertainty, and measure the
volatility and distributional effects of ALIGN-TRUST on seller
revenues.
We use a custom, discrete event, packet-level simulator for
single-seller bandwidth trading markets. Buyers place bids and
send and receive data. The seller has a ﬁxed size packet queue
which supports either FIFO or strict priority routing: in BKS
and VMM, the lowest priority packet gets dropped when the
queue is full. In FIXED, the arriving packet is dropped.
Unless stated otherwise, we use the following parameters,
chosen to illustrate the properties of our scheme. Each run
lasts 3000 simulated seconds. The seller’s forwarding capacity
is 1.5 packets per second. The seller’s packet queue can store
10 packets. Buyers generate packets according to a Poisson
distribution with a given mean.6 A slight difference from
our theoretical demand model is that when buyer packets get
dropped, they are queued at the buyer to be resent quickly
but not instantaneously. The  parameter of BKS is 0.2. The
5See Section V for more about demand models.
6Note that if we could assume that demand was always Poisson, we could
use statistical methods to estimate counterfactuals without using BKS. We use
Poisson demand in our simulations, but do not allow our mechanism to rely
on that knowledge.Fig. 2. BKS provides truthfulness without compromising on efﬁciency.
reserve price is 0. Each plot shows an average over at least
100 simulation runs. In many of the simulations, we focus on
the properties in regard to a single buyer, and emulate the total
demand of everyone else via a second buyer.
A. Incentive properties of VMM
Building on the counter-example in Section II-A, Figure 1
conﬁrms that VMM is not incentive-compatible, and that the
manipulator’s gain in utility and the drop in social welfare can
be signiﬁcant. In this experiment, there are two buyers. Buyer
1 has value 2 and bids truthfully. Buyer 0, the manipulating
buyer, has value 3, and varies its bid as shown on the x axis.
Buyer 0’s average demand is 5 packets/sec and that of Buyer
1 is 1 packets/sec. The seller capacity is 5 packets/sec and the
seller queue is has size 3. We show the average of 1000 runs
of 300 simulated seconds each. The bottom two lines show
buyer 0’s utility: with VMM, when bidding less than buyer 1,
buyer 0 pays 0, and improves utility. In contrast, underbidding
does not help with BKS. The top two lines show social welfare,
and conﬁrm that manipulation noticeably harms efﬁciency.
B. BKS: Efﬁciency and incentive properties
In Figure 2, we compare the efﬁciency of BKS, VMM,
and FIXED as seller capacity varies, with truthful bidding.
Buyer 0’s demand is 0.5 and buyer 1’s is 1.5 packets/sec.
BKS and VMM are signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient than FIXED
under congestion, while BKS is almost as efﬁcient as VMM.
The slight drop in efﬁciency from VMM to BKS is due to
the bid resampling in BKS. Thus, the BKS scheme provides
truthfulness with almost no adverse effect on efﬁciency.
We now turn to a setting where our theory does not apply
directly. We modify the simulated auctions to allows new bids
to be submitted at regular intervals, where these intervals may
not be correctly aligned with the underyling market dynamics.
To simulate this, we allow a buyer’s demand to change at any
time. We deﬁne bid duration as the time period between bids
imposed by the market design, and thus the time period over
which BKS resampling is done. We study the affect of varying
this bid duration.
Fig. 3. Effect of manipulation on BKS when a buyer revises bids frequently.
Figure 3 shows the effect of manipulation on BKS for
various bid durations up to 225 seconds. Here, buyer 1
has constant value of 5 and demand of 1 packet/sec, and
faces another buyer with value 4 but whose demand changes
randomly between 0.5 and 1.5, every 10 seconds. Figure 3
shows buyer 1’s utility for truthful bidding (solid line) and
under-bidding (shaving his bid by 0.75, dotted line). For low
bid durations, underbidding is proﬁtable, because it avoids
overpaying when buyer 2’s demand is high (and since the bid
duration does not correctly capture the bursty demand of buyer
2.) For longer durations, the mechanism is able to correctly
estimate the externality imposed on buyer 2 by buyer 1. This
demonstrates that setting a long enough bid revision time can
mitigate opportunities for manipulation even when the sessions
for bidders are no longer exactly aligned with the bid revision
opportunity, as is assumed in the theory.7
C. Revenue pooling
In this section we conﬁrm our theoretical results about
revenue pooling in simulation, showing that the center will
not have to run a loss while also demonstrating that pooling
reduces the variance of seller revenue. Figure 4 shows the
pooled revenue vs unpooled revenue for 200 sellers from four
different settings: capacities 2.0 or 4.0, and buyers with total
demand 3 or 4.5. These are indicated by different markers.
Note the dramatic reduction in variance of pooled seller
revenue for each seller category: without revenue pooling, the
seller revenue varies from -10000 to almost 45000, despite
each point being sampled from similar settings. However,
the pooled revenue varies very little (less than 10000), thus
resulting in a horizontal clustering of points for a given
seller category. The sellers do not all end up with the same
revenue—sellers with higher non-pooled revenue have higher
ﬁnal revenue as well.
7We have also examined the effect of bid duration when a buyer has
dynamically varying per-packet value, and a good compromise can be struck
between permitting frequent enough opportunity for value revision with
long enough sample periods to assess externality correctly and avoid over-
payments.Various categories of sellers
Fig. 4. Effect of revenue pooling.
V. DISCUSSION
We now discuss two technical issues. The ﬁrst has to do
with the availability of counterfactual allocations. In the simple
open-loop demand model used in this paper, where packet
arrivals do not depend on the router behavior, the router could
in principle log all packet arrivals and compute counterfactual
allocations for different bid vectors by replaying the log. BKS
is still relevant for two reasons. First, logging and replaying
the logs is impractical for space and performance reasons.
More fundamentally, the availability of counterfactuals is an
artifact of our model, which elided many real-world aspects
of networks for analytic tractability. In realistic network set-
tings with adaptive buyers and varying network conditions,
counterfactual allocations are not available.
What would it take to apply BKS to such settings? One
requirement is that the underlying allocation rule must be
monotone. In routing, this depends on the combination of
the selected routing rule and the demand model. With our
simple demand model, it is easy to show monotonicity for
the highest-bid-ﬁrst routing rule, and we have preliminary
results that suggest that many other natural routing rules also
work. We have a proof that our results for buyer-side incentive
compatibility extend to a closed-loop demand model where
users wait until their previous packet was forwarded before
generating the next packet, in the case where sellers continue
to follow the intended routing policy. On the sell-side, we
retain the alignment between social welfare and seller revenue
obtained through revenue pooling in moving to a closed loop
model. Although a seller with a good model of the future could
beneﬁt by deviating from the highest-bid-ﬁrst routing policy,
any beneﬁt also accrues to market efﬁciency. Moreover, we
conjecture that such a deviation would also retain monotonicity
and thus buy-side incentives.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have outlined an approach to prioritized bandwidth
access in a dynamic environment. We argued that counterfac-
tuals are often unavailable in this setting, making it a natural
domain for applying the sampling methods from BKS [2],
which had previously been primarily applied to multi-armed
bandit settings. The approach aligns incentives for a simple
model of ﬁxed per-packet value and known arrival-departure
intervals, and suggests a general protocol that allows periodic
bid revision. Through random bid perturbations, a correct
estimate of the externality imposed by one user on the rest of
the system can be made, addressing a systematic over-payment
problem with myopic packet-level auctions. A revenue pooling
method addresses incentive problems on the sell side. In future
work, we will complete a comprehensive simulation study
of the robustness and efﬁciency properties of the scheme in
different competitive environments and for different demand
models, and consider competition between sellers.
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